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DANGERS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF KADIC v. KARADZIC
David S. Bloch*
I. INTRODUCTION
Enacted in 1789, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)' provides the
chief means by which a foreigner may recover in United States federal
courts for torture or other violations of international "human rights"
norms. It provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' Though subject to
many exceptions, ATCA has been a useful tool in ensuring justice for
injured aliens. ATCA suits can also further international human rights
policies via the U.S. courts. In addition, the legislative grant of juris-
diction over certain classes of international criminals serves to bolster
* B.A., Reed College (Phi Beta Kappa), 1993; M.P.H., J.D. cum laude, George Washing-
ton University, 1996; Member, State Bar of California, the Bar of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, and the Bar of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1996). An interesting exchange regarding the original purpose of the
Alien Tort Claims Act, inspired in part by the Karadzic litigation, may be found in Joseph
Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 447 (1995) (contending that the ATCA originally referred only to certain forms
of piracy, particularly the unlawful boarding of ships suspected of aiding the enemy in times of
war) and William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
'Originalists', 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221 (1996) (contending that the drafters of
the ATCA in the First Congress did not express a desire to limit it to one class of torts, and
that broad language should be broadly construed). In court, Professor Dodge seems to have won
the day: Chief Judge Newman denied a petition for rehearing based on Professor Sweeney's
article. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1996).
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the international legal order and, in some cases, to shift a given propo-
sition toward the status of opinio juris.3
A number of federal courts have applied the ATCA. Recent litiga-
tion indicates that it creates a private right of action.4 However, by its
language, the statute only pertains to (1) alien litigants (2) wronged in
tort (3) in violation of the law of nations or of U.S. treaty law.5 These
requirements carry with them jurisdictional and substantive limitations.
ATCA does not, for instance, provide an alternative basis on which
States or their leaders may claim sovereign immunity.6 Also, ATCA
may only be invoked by a non-American.7 Finally, the fact that the tort
at issue must violate the law of nations limits the applicability of
ATCA to those actors who are subject to international law.
The Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic8 eliminates the
requirement that the defendant in an ATCA suit must be in some way
subject to international law. The Karadzic decision9 permits an ATCA
suit against an individual who, though the leader of an international
entity, did not act on behalf of a sovereign State and therefore cannot
properly be thought of as subject to the dictates of the law of nations.
The Second Circuit's well-intentioned decision has the beneficial effect
of bringing to bear the weight of the U.S. legal system against a man
3. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 is a striking example of how jurisdictional
legislation can further the development of international law. The Act restates the American
belief that torture is unlawful in international law and provides for lawsuits over torture under
the ATCA-none of which is remarkable by itself. However, the Torture Victim Protection Act
does not have any effect on the substantive or procedural laws of the United States-by all
accounts, it merely reaffirms Filartiga's interpretation of the Alien Tort Claims Act. As such, it
is best viewed as a political statement regarding a contested question of international law (rein-
forcing the international consensus that State torture is prohibited), rather than as a clarification
or modification of court jurisdiction. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note) (1996); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (in dicta); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos , 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 934 (1995). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
5. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887.
6. Immunity for States or heads of state is governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1979, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1603-11 (1996).
7. "Alien" is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States,!' 8
U.S.C. § I101(a)(3) (1996).
8. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (1996).
9. In the body of the text, I often refer to the Second Circuit's decision as Karadzic rather
than Kadic to associate the case's doctrine with the personality who gave rise to the initial law-
suit; it is often referred to as Kadic in footnotes to distinguish it more readily from Doe v.
Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). I refer to the district court's opinion in the matter
as Doe, after the first named plaintiff in the action.
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suspected of serious war crimes. However, it opens a Pandora's box of
international law problems. The unintended consequences of the
Karadzic decision are serious enough to warrant its reversal.
II. KADIC v. KARADZiC
Dr. Radovan Karadzic, past President of the ruling triumvirate of
the Bosnian Serb entity known as the Srbska Republic and a combatant
in the cause of Serbian ethnic independence since the collapse of com-
munist Yugoslavia, has entered the United States on several occasions
as the guest of either the United Nations or the U.S. Department of
State." In 1993, the two groups of plaintiffs" in the consolidated suit
of Kadic v. Karadzic served Karadzic with the necessary summons to
institute a lawsuit alleging various acts of rape, torture and genocide
(more generally, "ethnic cleansing") committed at his order or by un-
derlings for whom he was responsible. 2
The suit, filed in the Southern District of New York, alleged juris-
diction principally under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 3 The plaintiffs al-
so claimed jurisdiction under the Torture Victim Protection Act, federal
question jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplementary juris-
diction over several state-law claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1367.'
Karadzic advanced two contradictory theories in the hopes of defeating
jurisdiction: (1) that the Srbska Republic is a State for purposes of
international law, and (2) that it is not."
It is settled American law that a foreign head of state cannot be
sued in U.S. court.' 6 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1979
10. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237.
11. The Doe plaintiffs consist of Jane Doe I, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, and Jane Doe 11, on behalf of herself and as administratrix of her deceased mother's
estate. The Kadic plaintiffs consist of Ms. S. Kadic and her infant sons Benjamin and Ognjen,
along with the Internationalna Iniciativa Zena Bosne I Hercegovine "Biser" and Zene Bosne I
Hercegovine.
12. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37. It is safe to say that Dr. Karadzic's activities would sound in
tort, were jurisdiction available. A compelling and lengthy discussion of the atrocities commit-
ted by the Bosnian Serbs in the former Yugoslavia appears in Michele Brandt, Comment, Doe
v. Karadzic: Redressing Non-State Acts of Gender-Specific Abuse Under the Alien Tort Statute,
79 MINN. L. REv. 1413, 1413-14, 1416-21 (1995).
13. See Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
14. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995). In personam jurisdiction over
foreign States and their instrumentalities is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1330, limited by the ex-
ceptions in §§ 1602-08.
15. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
16. See Doe, 886 F. Supp. at 738 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (1996). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is the definitive
statement of the United States govemment in the area of jurisdiction over foreign States; in a
conflict, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act will trump the Alien Tort Claims Act. E.g.,
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); see In re Estateof
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(FSIA) indicates that "Subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party [on October 21, 1976] a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
and of the States."'7 FSIA's blanket immunity "includes a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a for-
eign state."'" To assert immunity, an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign State may be any entity "which is a separate legal person, cor-
porate or otherwise."' 9 This language encompasses natural persons
acting as acknowledged political agents of a State; certainly, a President
qualifies. If the Srbska Republic were a State in the eyes of American
law, the case against Karadzic could not go forward.' As President of
the Srbska Republic, Karadzic would be entitled to personal head-of-
state immunity."
If the Srbska Republic were not a State, Karadzic would still es-
cape jurisdiction. Arguing in the alternative, Karadzic contended that
the Srbska Republic does not exist as an international person, having
not been recognized or otherwise accorded the prerogatives of State-
hood by the international community or by the U.S. As such, Karadzic
leads a private organization, the actions of which are not the appropri-
ate subject of international law.' Lacking direction from or authority
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that FSIA supersedes
ATCA in suits against individuals acting in their "official capacity" on behalf of a foreign gov-
ernment).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1).
20. There are several exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act waiver (28
U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1)), actions based on commercial activity in the United States (28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2)), certain actions regarding real property in the United States (28 U.S.C.
§§ 1605(a)(3)-(4)), tortious conduct in the United States (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)), actions to
enforce arbitration clauses in contracts governed by United States law (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)
(1996)), certain suits in admiralty (28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(b)-(d)), and in counterclaims to suits
brought by a foreign State (28 U.S.C. § 1607). None applies here.
21. See Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp 734, 737-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see Lafontant v.
Aristide, 844 F.Supp. 128, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing "absolute" head-of-state immunity).
22. See Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 739-40; see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 422 (1964) (the "traditional view of international law is that it establishes substantive
principles for determining whether one country had wronged another"); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 n. 22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Classical international law was
predominantly statist. The law of nations traditionally was defined as 'the body of rules and
principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another"')
(Edwards, J., concurring) (emphasis and citations omitted); id. at 805-06 ("international law
imposes duties only on states and on their agents or officials") (Bork., J., concurring);
Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The standards
by which nations regulate their dealings with one another inter se constitute the 'law of
nations'. These standards include the rules of conduct which govern the affairs of this nation,
acting in its national capacity, in relationships with other nations") (citations omitted).
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of a State instrumentality, Dr. Karadzic's orders could only be viewed
as the words and acts of a private citizen-and thus could not form the
basis of jurisdiction under the ATCA.' The support for this position is
voluminous and was, until the Karadzic decision, not seriously in ques-
tion.
24
District Judge Peter K. Leisure accepted the contention that the
Srbska Republic was not a State for purposes of U.S. law and therefore
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.' In addition to terminat-
ing ATCA jurisdiction, the conclusion that the Srbska Republic is not a
State mandated the dismissal of the Torture Victim Protection Act
claim, since § 2(a) of that Act requires conduct "under actual or appar-
ent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation."' With the two
major bases of jurisdiction eliminated, Judge Leisure did not find a
valid federal question at issue, and declined to extend supplemental
jurisdiction:
Since private acts of individuals do not violate the laws of nations, even
assuming arguendo, that this Court were willing to attempt to find an implied
cause of action, which it is not, this Court is doubtful that one could be im-
plied as to the defendant because the acts attributed to [Karadzicl were per-
formed in a private capacity. Accordingly, those allegedly harmed by the acts
of defendant cannot assert an implied right of action arising from the law of
nations and § 1331.27
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for a trial on
the merits, in the process altering its rulings in Filartiga' and
Klinghoffer,29 and creating serious, if unintended, consequences for
23. See Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 739-40.
24. See Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp. 835 F.2d at 113-14. ("the Alien Tort
Statute does not confer subject matter jurisdiction over private parties who conspire in or aid
and abet, official acts of torture") (in dicta); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("we are aware of no treaty that purports to make the activities at issue here
[torture] unlawful when conducted by private individuals. As for the law of nations-so-called
'customary international law,' arising from 'the customs and usages of civilized nations,'-we
conclude that this also does not reach private, non-state conduct of this sort") (citations omit-
ted); Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (S.D.Fla. 1990) ("The contras are
private individuals whose actions simply do not represent state action"); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F.Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D.Cal. 1987) ("Of course, purely private torture will not normally
implicate the law of nations, since there is currently no international consensus regarding torture
practiced by non-state actors"); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) (28 U.S.C. § 1350 deals with relationships between nations, not
individuals).
25. See Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 744.
26. Id. at 741-43; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1996).
27. Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 743.
28. Filartiga held that official acts of torture violate international law. Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. Klinghoffer v. S. N. C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). Klinghoffer held that
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American and international law.
Ill. THE DANGERS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS
In his opinion for the Southern District of New York in the Doe
case, Judge Leisure held:
[T]he acts alleged in the instant action, while grossly repugnant, cannot be
remedied through 28 U.S.C. § 1350 [ATCA]. The current Bosnian-Serb war-
ring military faction does not constitute a recognized state... [and] the
members of Karadzic's faction do not act under the color of any recognized
state law.'
In deciding that the Srbska Republic was not a State, Judge Leisure
relied upon the Second Circuit's definition of Statehood:
The Second Circuit has limited the definition of 'state' to "entities that have a
defined and a permanent population, that are under the control of their own
government, and that engage in or have the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities." Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937
F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotations, brackets and citation omitted). The
current Bosnia-Serb entity fails to meet this definition.3'
This definition, in turn, restates the traditional understanding of the
prerequisites of Statehood in the international arena.32 The Second
Circuit's decision in Karadzic rewrites this definition in a way wholly
at variance with accepted international law: armed non-State entities,
acting on foreign soil against non-Americans, are now subject to U.S.
tort jurisdiction.
Reversing Judge Leisure, the Second Circuit indicated that it was
less sanguine about the notion of letting a perpetrator of genocide go
free. The Appellate Court's sentiments are quite understandable, given
the plight of the plaintiffs:
On about April 15, 1992, Bosnian-Serb soldiers decapitated K's son while
she held him in her arms. Bosnian-Serb Soldiers (sic] later captured K, sent
her to a detention camp, and raped her ten times daily for twenty-one days.
the Palestine Liberation Organization is not a sovereign State for purposes of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act. Chairman Arafat's PLO of 1991 controlled territory in Lebanon and Isra-
el, represented a permanent Palestinian population via a functioning governmental leadership
structure, and certainly had the power to engage in formal relations (as witnessed in the current
Israeli-PLO accords). Arafat's PLO is difficult to distinguish from President Karadzic's Srbska
Republic of 1996. However, it should be noted that Klinghoffer did not implicate the ATCA
because the plaintiffs were American.
30. Doe, 866 F.Supp. at 740-41.
31. Id. at 741 n. 12.
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 (1986) ("Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities"); Louis HENKIN ET AL., IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 243-56 (3d ed. 1993).
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On May 31, 1992, eight Bosnian-Serb soldiers raped a teenage prisoner (Jane
Doe I) while she was imprisoned in a Bosnian-Serb concentration camp.
After the ordeal, one of the soldiers slashed Jane Doe I's breasts. On June 28,
1992, soldiers beat an eighteen-year-old woman (Jane Doe II) while she
watched Bosnian-Serb soldiers rape her mother.33
Several jurisdictional theories have been advanced to cover such
conduct, but none have succeeded. At least one commentator, denounc-
ing Judge Leisure's decision to dismiss the suit prior to the Second
Circuit's reversal, suggests that jurisdiction should be available because
the Srbska Republic has acquiesced to (and thus is subject to) Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, the provisions of which have in any event
passed into customary international law.34 This contention rests on two
propositions, both shaky. First, while the Bosnian-Serb "government"
has declared its allegiance to the Geneva Conventions, its lack of rec-
ognized sovereign capacity undercuts its ability to make such claims.
Second, that the Geneva Conventions (or aspects of them) are custom-
ary international law still begs the question of whether international law
of this sort acts on non-sovereign entities. In short, it is not clear that
the Srbska Republic can assent to be bound by an international agree-
ment, or that it would be bound by the dictates of the Geneva Conven-
tion in particular.
The same commentator also argues that jurisdiction should be
found under the Genocide Convention.35 However, that Convention
clearly has not reached the status of opinio juris since its ratification by
the United States in 1986. The Second Circuit's Karadzic decision
aside, courts are, in the main, extremely reluctant to declare universal
principles of international law.36 Unfortunately, the Second Circuit's
zeal in Karadzic to bring wrongdoers to justice in American court flies
in the face of established international law and creates problems the
court cannot possibly have contemplated.
A. International Law
The Second Circuit begins its decision in Karadzic by restating the
definition it set forth in Klinghoffer: "Under international law, a state is
an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under
33. Michele Brandt, Comment, Doe v. Karadzic: Redressing Non-State Acts of Gender-
Specific Abuse Under the Alien Tort Statute, 79 MiNN. L. REv. 1413, 1413-14 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).
34. Id. at 1427-32.
35. Id. at 1432.
36. See, e.g., Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the rights
of free expression and free speech are not universally recognized as the "law of nations" under
the ATCA); HIT v.Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that the principles
of the Ten Commandments are not universally recognized as international law).
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the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the ca-
pacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities."37 It then
emphasizes that the definition (culled from the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States) requires the "capacity
to engage in formal relations with other such entities" but not recogni-
tion by members of the international community.38 This comports with
American judicial pronouncements on the subject.39 Next, the Second
Circuit argues that the Srbska Republic's lack of formal recognition is
not a barrier to ATCA jurisdiction--on the unspoken premise that rec-
ognition is the only barrier to the Srbska Republic's capability to "en-
gage in formal relations." At first blush, it appears that the Srbska
Republic has the capability to engage in formal relations. Dr.
Karadzic's very presence at the Bosnian negotiating table implies that
his Republic is able to treat both with other warring factions and with
recognized governments.
This begs the question, however, of whether negotiations during a
civil war always connote that the rebel parties have the capacity to con-
duct formal relations with other States. The act of negotiation during
wartime is one of necessity; the existence of conflict indicates that the
parties themselves do not accept each other as sovereign, at least in the
disputed territory. That the Srbska Republic can play a role in such
peace discussions is entirely a result of its status as a combatant. Had
the Bosnian Serbs not taken up arms, "formal relations" would be im-
possible, just as they will be if Karadzic's militia loses the Bosnian
war. Karadzic leads an army, not a government. The capacity to engage
in formal relations cannot be defined solely on the basis of an ability to
raise troops and a willingness to engage in enough violence to spur
peace negotiations. Were the Bosnian Serbs not at war, there would be
no "relations" with the Srbska Republic-unless, of course, there was
recognition by the international community of a Bosnian Serb State.
Indeed, they are fighting in large measure for precisely this recognition.
To say, as the Second Circuit does, that the Srbska Republic is able to
conduct formal relations merely because it can compel negotiations
through force of arms is nothing more than a bow to strength and ag-
gression.
In support of its assertion that those acting on behalf of unrecog-
nized States may be brought before an American tribunal, the Second
37. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (unrecognized
communist Cuban regime); National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988) (Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeni); Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil of
New York, 186 N.E. 679 (1933) (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
[Vol. 4:1
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Circuit cites three cases.40 Two 4' involve the recognition of actions by
Confederate states during the Civil War-an area of law muddied sig-
nificantly by the fact that the underlying conflict challenged the very
validity of the courts that later decided the cases. The nature of the pur-
ported States involved is fundamentally different from that of any non-
American entity: the Confederacy will always have a unique status in
U.S. law." The third43 involves a dispute over actions by the former
East Germany-a nation which, while unrecognized at American law,
was recognized by a significant number of States (the Soviet Bloc)
whose international personhood was unquestioned. The Srbska Republic
does not enjoy such recognition. None of the cases the Second Circuit
cites, therefore, provide a clear justification for its ruling.
The Second Circuit also holds "that certain forms of conduct vio-
late the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals.""' The Court cites
piracy laws as an example,45 but the modern law of nations is by no
means as clear as the Second Circuit implies. Several other Circuits
have come to the contrary conclusion, namely, that international law
does not operate on persons acting in a wholly private capacity.' In
fact, the Second Circuit is entirely alone. The piracy example is inap-
posite. Piracy is unique, for example, in that it takes place in areas
where there is no state jurisdiction-the high seas. 7 Moreover, an
40. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.
41. See United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1875), and Thorington v.
Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1868).
42. For a discussion of the ways in which the Confederacy, and Southern law more gener-
ally, has shaped the broader American legal tradition, see JAMES W. ELY, JR. & DAVID J.
BODENHAMER, Regionalism and American Legal History: The Southern Experience, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 539 (1986).
43. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).
44. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
45. Id.
46. See Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779-80 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("the law
of nations provides no substantive right to be free from the private acts of individuals"); see In
Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 501, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Only individuals
who have acted under official authority or under color of such authority may violate interna-
tional law").
47. See LoUIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1302 (3d ed. 1993). Lack of territorial
jurisdiction is a defining characteristic of international piracy. Article 100 of the Law of the Sea
Convention indicates that "All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repres-
sion of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 100, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA,
21 I.L.M. 1261, 1288 (1982). The international law against piracy is in the nature of an agree-
ment between nations to forestall harm to citizens and commercial interests in areas where an
1996]
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American-flagged ship is conventionally considered American territory
for purposes of legal control and ownership.' As such, a pirate's at-
tack on an American vessel is a tort against an American entity on, as
it were, American soil. Thus, piracy against Americans is justiciable
under domestic law-international law is not the sole basis of jurisdic-
tion. Though some commentators view piracy as an "individual viola-
tion of international law," others contend that the international law of
piracy is jurisdictional in nature: it allows States to apply national laws
to individuals (pirates) who would otherwise be beyond reach.' In any
event, the international prohibition on acts of piracy is universally rec-
ognized in a way that a prohibition on civil war atrocities is not.5"
The Second Circuit is surely correct when it states that:
The customary international law of human rights, such as the proscription of
official torture, applies to states without distinction between recognized and
unrecognized states.... It would be anomalous indeed if non-recognition by
the United States, which typically reflects disfavor with a foreign re-
gime-sometimes due to human rights abuses-had the perverse effect of
shielding officials of the unrecognized regime from liability for those viola-
tions of international law norms that apply only to state actors."
But there is a crucial distinction between unrecognized States and non-
States. Eliding this distinction raises problems that the Second Circuit
likely did not foresee. Having failed to recognize that it is only the
Bosnian Serbs' willingness to take up arms which permits them to enter
agreements of any sort, the Second Circuit concludes, quite wrongly,
that:
Karadzic's regime satisfies the criteria for a state, for purposes of those inter-
national law violations requiring state action. Srbska is alleged to control
defined territory, control populations within its power, and to have entered
into agreements with other governments. It has a president, a legislature, and
its own currency. These circumstances readily appear to satisfy the criteria
for a state in all aspects of international law. 2
The result is a reward to blackmail and a gift to terrorists-and it
is neither compelled by nor consistent with international law. Indeed,
rather than reflecting international law, the Second Circuit is attempting
to make law. The Court argues that "evolving standards of international
law govern who is within the [Alien Tort Act's] jurisdictional grant."53
individual State cannot patrol.
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 502 (1986).
49. See HENgiN ET AL., supra note 47, at 380.
50. See Id. at 1302 (citing Hackworth for the proposition that the illegality of piracy "has
long been recognized and well settled").
51. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
52. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
53. Id. at 241.
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However, the Court produces no evidence save the changed minds of
the judges to justify the conclusion that international law now operates
directly on individuals, as compared to the state of affairs when Tel-
Oren was decided in 1984 or In re Marcos in 1992.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Karadzic decision allows for-
eigners to sue such non-governmental, non-sovereign entities as the
United Nations and the European Union in U.S. courts for tort claims.
For that matter, the same Bosnian Muslims complaining of genocide in
the instant cases could raise interesting claims against NATO and other
Western/European security alliances, which remained passive while
Karadzic's "ethnic cleansing" policies were implemented. Such claims
reject a fundamental premise of international law, namely, that inter-
national law imposes duties upon nations, not individuals or non-State
entities. The proper subject of international law has never been entities
which lack international personhood; NATO is not a member of the
UN. In a way, this is the result of a notion of "due process": an entity
that lacks the standing to parley in an international forum should not be
held accountable to laws that it cannot, by its nature, affect. If interna-
tional law is to operate on entities without international personhood, it
must do so via the mediating institutions of State law, in which the
offending entity at least theoretically has both a stake and an ability to
affect outcomes. Moreover, entities which lack international personhood
cannot "contract" with states in the international community, since they
lack the requisite sovereignty to bind themselves to treaty agreements.
International law is in some sense voluntary (there being no overarching
government), and non-sovereign entities lack the capacity to participate
in the international community. 4
B. The Law of Unintended Consequences
In addition, the Karadzic decision may help legitimize the Srbska
regime-an unintended consequence, but one which clearly follows.
The Second Circuit is walking an untenable line by holding Dr.
Karadzic accountable for the violations of international law committed
by the Srbska Republic without acknowledging the international
personhood of that Republic. Every act which acknowledges Karadzic's
54. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 817 ("If it is in large part because 'the Law of Nations is pri-
marily a law between States,' ... that international law generally relies on an enforcement
scheme in which individuals have no direct role, that reliance also reflects recognition of some
other important characteristics of international law that distinguish it from municipal law. Chief
among these is the limited role of law in the international realm. International law plays a much
less pervasive role in the ordering of states' conduct within the international community than
does municipal law in the ordering of individuals' conduct within nations. Unlike our nation,
for example, the international community could not plausibly be described as governed by laws
rather than men") (citations omitted) (Bork, J., concurring).
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regime in the international realm strengthens his government's preten-
sions of legitimacy.
In like fashion, the Second Circuit's redefinition of
sovereignty--even for limited purposes-strengthens the "sovereign"
status of various international organizations, e.g., the World Trade Or-
ganization, the European Union. Thus, this redefinition fuels the objec-
tions of nations and commentators who see membership in international
organizations as a relinquishment of sovereignty.55
The potential for mischief is nearly limitless. Unhappy Englishmen
injured in "the troubles" could sue the Irish Republican Army-not a
state, but also not subject to another state's sovereignty, in control of
territory and recognized to the extent that Sinn Fein leader Gerry Ad-
ams is treated as a head of state in American courts. This would under-
mine State Department attempts to forge a peace accord between the
warring Irish and British forces. More dangerously, consider a suit
against the Chechen rebels by an aggrieved Russian visitor. Recognition
of a Chechen State by the courts of the U.S.-even if only for the
purposes of attaching liability for war crimes and vindicating the legiti-
mate grievances of the Russian plaintiff-could have serious repercus-
sions in the revalescent Russian Duma.
Whether to antagonize men like Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov is a
decision best left to American diplomatic authorities. If the State De-
partment loses unitary control over the instrumentalities of state recog-
nition, its hand in international relations is weakened. The Second Cir-
cuit discusses the possibility of withholding judgment as a matter of
prudence, 6 but concludes that "[n]ot every case 'touching foreign
relations' is nonjusticiable,... and judges should not reflexively in-
yoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions
in the context of human rights."57 The choice of the phrase "somewhat
sensitive" suggests that the Second Circuit did not, in fact, consider the
long-term consequence of its decision. It is difficult, if not impossible,
55. Such objectors exist Left and Right. See, e.g., James Sheehan, Free Trade Casualties,
WASH. TiMEs, July 5, 1995, at A15; Julie Kirkbride, Tories Face Conference Coup Over Eu-
rope, THE DAiLY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), July 18, 1995, at 4 (discussing Tory factions that
oppose further European (monetary) integration); Tom Diemer, Populist Message Echoes Demo-
cratic Themes, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 25, 1996, at A16 (noting, of Patrick Buchanan, U. S.
Rep. James A. Traficant (D-OH) and the Rev. Jesse Jackson: "Each vehemently opposes the
international trade agreements known as NAFTA and GATT.... Buchanan fears the loss of U.
S. sovereignty under a 'New World Order"').
56. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit's decision
not to decline jurisdiction is perhaps already being felt in other politically-charged cases. See,
e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Kadic in support of ju-
risdiction). It should be noted that Abebe-Jira involves a suit against a former underling of the
Dergue military dictatorship in Ethiopia, and is well within the scope of the ATCA.
57. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (internal citations omitted).
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to entice an organization like the Palestinian Liberation Organization"
or even the European Union to negotiate when U.S. courts are purport-
ing to pass judgment against them in their quasi-sovereign capacity.
In fact, the Karadzic decision provides incentives for foreign vic-
tims to sue non-State "entities" and their leaders: money damages are
available, America is a high-profile forum and no other courtrooms are
open to the plaintiffs. 9 The federal court system becomes a true world
court, with vast jurisdiction over private and public wrongs, backed by
the prestige (and, implicitly, the coercive power) of the United States.
But every adverse judgment paradoxically reinforces the defendant
entity's claim to international personhood and, ultimately, Statehood.
The victim thus aggrandizes his oppressor through operation of U.S.
law. Certainly, this was not what the Second Circuit intended when it
allowed Ms. Kadic and her infant sons to go forward in their quest to
avenge Dr. Karadzic's ethnic cleansing. But this is the result and, to the
extent that Ms. Kadic's victory ultimately strengthens the Srbska regime
and other such entities worldwide, it is not worth the cost.
60
IV. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic is well-inten-
tioned, even noble-an expression of the righteous indignation felt by
Americans of all persuasions when faced with horrors on a massive
scale. Nevertheless, when considered dispassionately, it is a radical
departure from the settled law of nations. The American justice system
is ill-suited to play a global court of equity; it lacks both the mandate
and the competence to assume such a role. The newly-minted Karadzic
doctrine muddies international law, weakens American diplomacy and
strengthens the very outlaws it is intended to attack. Cases following it
are already beginning to appear.6' The Karadzic decision is a danger-
58. As Judge Bork notes:
The potential for interference with foreign relations is not diminished by the
PLO's apparent lack of international law status as a state. Nor does it matter
whether the Executive Branch officially recognizes, or has direct dealings
with, the PLO. The fact remains that the PLO bears significantly upon the
foreign relations of the United States. If any indication of that role is needed,
it is provided by the official "observer" status that the PLO has been accorded
at the United Nations.... as well as by the diplomatic relations that the PLO
is reported to have with some one hundred countries around the world.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
59. See Hope Viner Sambom, Ruling Could Lead to More Human Rights Tort Cases: Court
Permits Lawsuit Against Bosnian Serbs, 81 A.B.A. J. 30 (Dec. 1995).
60. The unthinking, single-minded, and ultimately short-sighted zeal of the litigants is per-
haps not surprising, given that Ms. Kadic's attorneys in the matter included feminist Catherine
MacKinnon. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236.
61. The first such case appears to be Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, which involves the
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ous precedent, and should be overturned.
tribal conflict in Rwanda. Mushikiwabo, brought (like Doe) in the Southern District of New
York, is a somewhat closer case: Barayagwiza's Hutu militia acted in conjunction with (and
possibly at the behest of) Rwandan State officials to massacre members of the rival Tutsi tribe,
including members of the plaintiffs' families. A fair argument for agency thus exists. Still, the
court relied in large measure on the Karadzic doctrine in permitting the suit: "In Kadic, the
Second Circuit held that acts of genocide ... are actionable under the Alien Tort Act...
whether or not committed by a state." Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 CIV. 3627 (JSM),
1996 WL 164496, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996). The court entered a default judgment
awarding the 5 plaintiffs sums ranging from $10.7 million to $35.2 million, numbers surely
large enough to gain international attention. 1d. at *3.
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